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THEN NOW
MODERNIZING THE STATE  
CORPORATE INCOME TAX 
MARKET-BASED APPORTIONMENT FOR CONTENT PROVIDERS
BY RICHARD D. POMP
2This Issue Paper discusses how technology has overtaken 
the traditional ways the states tax the income of “content 
providers” that operate broadcast and cable networks, 
sell advertising, and produce content such as movies and 
television programs. This content is licensed at wholesale 
to distributors and along with the advertising, is watched 
by customers of these distributors on their televisions, 
smart phones, tablets, gaming consoles, and computers—
either in their homes or on the move.
The so-called “model” for taxing multistate businesses like 
content providers--the Uniform Division of Income for Tax 
Purposes Act (UDITPA)--was developed in 1957 and has 
been adopted in whole or in part by most states. Obviously, 
a tax system built on a 1957 foundation cannot begin to 
cope with today’s highly technological and digital world. 
Without the benefit of a model that can accommodate the 
21st century, the states have been left on their own to try 
to modernize their laws. The result has been constant 
change and flux.
This Paper endorses a new approach to the income 
taxation of content providers, one unaffected by, rather 
than becoming antiquated by, tomorrow’s technology. 
The approach assigns receipts of content providers based 
on the commercial domicile of their customers—an 
approach that will not be overtaken by technology and 
one that introduces stability, predictability, and certainty 
into the tax system and reduces litigation. Moreover, the 
rule captures the location of the customers and the true 
market of the content providers.
The rule is free from the conceptual and administrative 
defects that plague other approaches, such as an audience 
factor or a population factor. Assigning sales based on the 
customer’s commercial domicile would free policy makers 
from the need for constant tinkering with the tax law every 
time a technological innovation led to a new way of doing 
business for a content provider. This rule has already been 
adopted by some states.
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4I. INTRODUCTION
The law is typically reactive, addressing yesterday’s 
problems. In an area of slow moving change and 
developments, this commonplace approach is acceptable. 
But in a field of rapid technological innovation, yesterday’s 
problems have nothing to do with today’s. Yesterday’s 
science fiction fantasies are today’s realities.
This paper discusses how technology has overtaken the 
traditional ways the states tax the income of companies 
like NBCUniversal, CBS, Disney, Time Warner, Fox and 
Viacom. These companies operate cable and broadcast 
networks, sell advertising and produce content such as 
movies and television programs. This content is licensed 
at wholesale to distributors and along with the advertising, 
is watched by customers of these distributors on their 
televisions, smart phones, tablets, gaming consoles, and 
computers—either in their homes or on the move. For 
ease of presentation, these companies are referred to as 
“content providers.”
The content and advertising is distributed through five 
types of distributors: TV station affiliates (e.g., the local 
Fox, NBC, CBS, or ABC station);1 national cable system 
operators (e.g., Comcast, Charter Communications, Time 
Warner Cable, Cox Communications);2 satellite television 
(e.g., Dish TV, DirecTV);3 telecom distributors (e.g., AT&T, 
Verizon); and Internet distributors (e.g., Netflix, Hulu, 
Vudu, Amazon, RIM, Google, Yahoo, Apple).4
With limited exceptions, the content providers do not 
own or control any of these distributors. With the 
exception of Comcast’s ownership of NBCUniversal, the 
content providers are not owned or controlled by any of 
the distributors.
The so-called “model” for taxing multistate businesses, 
including content providers--the Uniform Division of 
Income for Tax Purposes Act (UDITPA)--was developed in 
1957 and has been adopted in whole or in part by most 
states. UDITPA was adopted when there were only 48 
states, before the widespread use of color televisions, 
the existence of satellite television, computers, videos, 
laptops, tablets, DVDs and smart phones. Hula Hoops, not 
Hulu, were the country’s obsession when this so-called 
“model” tax act was enacted. Amazingly, UDITPA has 
never been amended.5
Obviously, a tax system built on a 1957 foundation cannot 
begin to cope with today’s highly technological and 
digital world. Without the benefit of a model that can 
accommodate the 21st century, the states have been left 
on their own to try to modernize their laws. The result has 
been constant change and flux and the lack of consistency 
among the states, which sacrifices fundamental goals 
of a sound tax system. The law generally, and tax law 
specifically, should provide certainty and stability, allowing 
businesses to invest confidently and state legislatures 
to predict their annual revenue so they can plan their 
spending. Tax rules should not be overtaken and rendered 
obsolete by new ways of doing business, especially in an 
area marked by rapid technological innovation. 
Taxpayers and state governments should not have to 
resort to costly and distracting litigation to fit new business 
practices into outdated statutes. Nor should legislatures 
be constantly asked to shift their attention and resources to 
amending their tax statutes to keep up with new practices. 
Constant change creates an unfavorable business climate 
and discourages investment. By contrast, tax rules that can 
accommodate unpredictable technological developments 
are to be welcomed by taxpayers and state governments.
This Paper endorses a new approach to the income 
taxation of content providers, one unaffected by, rather 
than becoming antiquated by, tomorrow’s technology. The 
goal is to provide an approach that will provide certainty, 
stability, and predictability, consistent with the guiding 
principles of a state corporate income tax. 
To appreciate the issues involved in the state taxation of 
content providers, the difficulties that have arisen, and a 
solution to the problem, Section II below provides a brief 
introduction to the structure of a state corporate income 
tax.6 Particular emphasis is on the sales factor, which is at 
the heart of this Paper and poses the greatest challenge 
for content providers. Traditional ways of calculating the 
sales factor are inadequate. Section III provides a solution 
to the sales factor: assigning receipts based on the state of 
the commercial domicile of a content provider’s customer, 
an approach that has already been adopted by Florida, 
Illinois, Michigan, North Carolina and Oregon.
II. THE STRUCTURE  
OF A STATE CORPORATE 
INCOME TAX
A. Overview
Almost all the states have a corporate income tax in 
order to raise revenue from those doing business within 
their borders. These states face a common challenge: 
how much of the profits of a multistate business are they 
entitled to tax?
To use a metaphor, the overall profits of a multistate 
corporation can be viewed as constituting the size of a 
pizza pie. The challenge for a state is to determine the 
slice of the pizza that it can appropriately tax.
5Every state follows the UDITPA approach, which 
determines a state’s “slice” through the use of a formula. 
This method is known as formulary apportionment 
because a formula is used to apportion the pie, that is, to 
determine a state’s slice.
UDITPA sets forth the following formula:7
Income Taxable by a State8 = Corporation’s Total 
Business Income × 1/3 (Sales Factor9 + Payroll Factor10 + 
Property Factor11).
A corporation determines its tax in State A by first 
calculating its total business income under State A law.12 
This amount represents a corporation’s preapportionment 
tax base—the size of the pizza pie. 
The corporation then calculates its apportionment 
percentage under the formula. Next, the corporation 
multiplies its total business income by the apportionment 
percentage. The result is the amount of the business 
income of the corporation that is apportioned to State 
A. The final step is to apply the state’s rate schedule to 
determine the corporation’s tax liability and to reduce that 
amount by any available credits.
The use of property and payroll in the formula reflects 
the capital and labor that contribute to the generation of 
income. The sales factor makes the formula politically 
attractive to states in which the corporation’s customers 
are located. The sales factor is commonly described as 
reflecting the corporation’s market, that is, where its 
customers are located.
The UDITPA formula has the virtue of using factors 
(property, payroll and sales) that are readily known to the 
taxpayer and that can be verified by a tax administration. 
Consequently, an advantage of the formula is that it divides 
income, which cannot be easily assigned geographically, 
using factors that can be located geographically, in a 
politically acceptable manner.
Around the 1970’s, some states started to deviate from the 
UDITPA evenly-weighted, three-factor formula in order to 
encourage economic development. A few states started 
to double weight the sales factor with many more doing 
so over the next few decades.13 Most recently, states have 
adopted a formula using only a sales factor.14 The use of 
only a sales factor places a premium on how it is calculated 
because any defects or weaknesses will be magnified and 
not offset by the property and payroll factors.
B. Calculating the Sales Factor
The heart of this Paper concerns calculating the sales 
factor. As the UDITPA formula above indicates, the more 
sales that are assigned to a state, the larger the numerator 
of the sales factor and consequently, the more income that 
will be apportioned to that state. This is especially true in 
states using only a sales factor. 
UDITPA provides two different approaches to calculating 
the sales factor: one for the receipts from the sale of 
tangible personal property and one for all other activities, 
which includes those provided by content providers.
1. Receipts from the Sale of Tangible Personal Property
Nearly every state employs the destination principle set 
forth in UDITPA for determining whether a sale of tangible 
property will be included in its receipts factor.15 Under the 
destination principle, tangible personal property shipped 
or delivered to customers in the taxing state will be 
included in the numerator of that state’s receipts factor. 
In the case of a sale by a manufacturer to a distributor, 
this rule assigns all the receipts to where the goods were 
delivered. That result recognizes that the distributor is 
the customer of the manufacturer. The manufacturer 
would not assign any of its sales to the states in which the 
distributor sold the goods because the customers of the 
distributor are not the customers of the manufacturer.16 
Put differently, there is no “look through” rule whereby the 
sale by the manufacturer is assigned to the state of the 
distributor’s customer. Yet some states would advocate 
a “look through” rule for content providers through an 
audience factor, discussed below.17
2. Receipts from all other Transactions
In the case of all other receipts, that is, receipts from 
other than the sale of tangible personal property, such 
as advertising services and the licensing of intangible 
personal property, UDITPA provides that when the income-
producing activity is performed in more than one state, as 
would be true in the case of content providers, the receipts 
are included in the numerator of the state in which a 
greater proportion of the income-producing activity is 
performed, as measured by “costs of performance.”18
The costs of performance rule is “all-or-nothing.” That is, 
if 3% of the costs of performance are incurred in each of 
32 states and 4% are incurred in another state, the entire 
gross receipts will be assigned to that latter state.
Under UDITPA’s “all or nothing” approach, gross receipts 
can be assigned to a state in which the taxpayer has no 
customers (or can be assigned to a state different from 
the one in which it has all of its customers). For example, 
consider a corporation that produces all of its services in 
State A and has only customers in State B. Under UDITPA, 
all of the gross receipts would be assigned to State A, 
even though the taxpayer has no customers there. None 
would be assigned to State B, where all of its customers 
are located. 
6The “all or nothing” feature of UDITPA’s costs of 
performance has proven controversial.19 Other criticism 
is that costs of performance are likely to overlap with 
the property and payroll factors producing a rule that 
is too heavily biased to the place of production and one 
that ignores the location of the taxpayer’s customers. 
These features can interfere with attempts at attracting 
businesses to locate or expand in a state. For example, 
a corporation moving its operations to a state might find 
that all of its income becomes taxable in that state, even 
though all of its customers are located elsewhere.
Criticism of UDITPA’s treatment of gross receipts from 
the sale of services or the licensing of intangible personal 
property has increased over time. Compared with 1957 
when UDITPA was adopted, many more interstate service 
providers exist today. Moreover, interstate providers of 
intangible property have also become commonplace 
because of the Internet and the digital economy.
Because of the dissatisfaction with the costs of 
performance rule, some states have distorted the concept 
to reach a destination or market-based approach, such as 
the use of an audience factor, the location of subscribers, 
or the billing address of the end user. Other states 
have adopted a more transparent approach, replacing 
costs of performance with an explicit statute adopting a 
destination or market-based approach. Still other states 
have interpreted ambiguous statutes in problematic ways 
to reach market-based results.20 
One of the rationales for these market-based approaches, 
even when not justified or supported by a statute, is to 
use a “destination” rule for the receipts from intangible 
property and advertising because such a rule would 
mirror the destination rule for tangible personal property. 
Ironically, however, although there is no “look through” 
rule for tangible personal property, these market-based 
approaches adopt one for the receipts from the licensing 
of intangible personal property and the receipts from 
advertising. These “look through” approaches focus 
on the viewers of the intangible property or advertising 
and consider those persons to be the content providers’ 
market, even though the providers actually license their 
content to a distributor and not to the viewer. In addition 
to this conceptual defect, some of these market-based 
approaches are difficult to apply and can be manipulated 
by taxpayers.21
C. Alternative Apportionment
Even in 1957 when UDITPA was adopted, it was clear 
that its rules could not anticipate or adequately address 
all situations. “One size could not fit all.” Accordingly, 
UDITPA Section 18 sets forth what is commonly 
known as alternative or equitable apportionment. This 
constitutionally mandated, exculpatory provision, having 
a statutory counterpart even in states not adopting 
UDITPA, provides that if the allocation and apportionment 
provisions do not fairly represent the extent of a taxpayer’s 
business activity in a state, the taxpayer may petition for, 
or the tax administrator may require, any other method 
that will result in a reasonable and equitable allocation 
and apportionment of the taxpayer’s income. Section 
18 acts as a safety valve, allowing tax administrators 
and taxpayers to smooth over the rough edges of the 
apportionment and allocation provisions when applied to 
a particular transaction.22
Section 18 implicitly recognizes that the UDITPA 
apportionment formula is a pragmatic political 
compromise that shares the tax base among the states 
where labor and capital exist and the states where 
customers are located. A Nobel Prize winning economist 
described the UDITPA formula as: “[t]his simple but 
arbitrary and capricious formula has all the earmarks of 
having been concocted by a committee of lawyers who had 
forgotten anything they ever were taught about statistics 
or economics.”23 There is nothing sacrosanct about the 
sales factor or the formula; the goal is to adopt a politically 
acceptable approach that can be reasonably administered 
and one that provides certainty, predictability, and stability.
III. BASIC PRINCIPLES  
OF APPORTIONMENT 
APPLIED TO CONTENT 
PROVIDERS: A SOLUTION 
TO THE SALES FACTOR
The content providers generate income in two different 
ways. One way is through advertising. The content 
providers are paid by national advertisers. The payments 
are for the content providers to include the advertising 
as part of the programs and movies that they wholesale 
to their distributors, such as local broadcast stations, 
cable systems, telecom distributors, satellite TV, and 
Internet distributors.24
It is important to clearly identify the customers of the 
content providers in the case of advertising. The customers 
of the content providers are the advertisers. This is the 
group that pays the content providers and that generates 
their advertising income.
The advertisers sell their own goods and services to 
their customers, which might be distributors, retailers, 
or end users. In no event, however, will these customers 
have any legal relationship with the content providers. 
7(In legal terms, no privity of contract exists between the 
content providers and the customers of the advertisers.) 
For example, if a product advertised on a program 
produced by a content provider is defective, the purchaser 
of the product would not deal with the content provider. 
Indeed, the content providers are even unaware of 
the identity or location of the customers that buy their 
advertisers’ products.
The second of the two sources of revenue for the content 
providers is the licensing of the programs or movies 
they produce. The content providers can be viewed as 
manufacturers of property—intangible property such as 
programs and movies. Their customers or “market” are 
the distributors to whom the content is wholesaled. The 
distributors are the group that pay the content providers 
and that generate their licensing income.
No legal relationship exists between the content providers 
and the customers of these distributors. For example, if a 
content provider licenses a program or movie to DirecTV 
or Netflix, the viewer of that content is DirecTV’s or 
Netflix’s customer, not the content provider’s customer. 
If a content provider wholesales a program to a national 
cable operator, the viewer of that content is the customer 
of the local cable system affiliate.25 If a problem develops 
with the viewing of the program, the viewer deals with the 
cable distributor, not the content provider. The viewers 
are likely unaware of who developed the content that they 
are viewing. And the content provider is likely unaware of 
the identity of the customers of its distributors, the home 
or billing addresses they used when they subscribed 
to a distributor’s programming package, or where the 
customers are physically located when they view the 
program or movie. 
With respect to the revenue received from licensing their 
programs and movies, the content providers are best 
analogized to manufacturers. Instead of manufacturing 
tangible personal property that is wholesaled to 
distributors, they manufacture intangible intellectual 
property that is wholesaled to distributors. The only 
reason why the destination principle of UDITPA does not 
apply is that the product that is manufactured is intangible 
rather than tangible.
Because content providers manufacture intangible 
property and/or provide advertising services, they 
are excluded from UDITPA’s destination principle and 
instead are covered by its controversial “all or nothing” 
costs of performance rule. To avoid that rule, some 
states adopted an audience factor to assign the receipts 
of content providers. The earliest states adopted an 
audience method in the 1980’s and some other states 
followed suit. No legislature, however, has adopted 
an audience factor since 2004, perhaps because the 
approach suffers from both conceptual and, more recently, 
administrative problems.26
Nonetheless, the Massachusetts Department of Revenue 
has recently resurrected an audience factor through a 
regulation. The Massachusetts Legislature provides that 
sales other than the sale of tangible personal property 
are in that State and thus included in the numerator of 
the Massachusetts sales factor, if “the corporation’s 
market for the sale is in the commonwealth.”27 The statute 
further provides that “a corporation’s market for the sale” 
is considered to be in Massachusetts “in the case of a 
service, if and to the extent the service is delivered to a 
location in the commonwealth.”28 
Under the auspices of this statute, the Department of 
Revenue recently adopted a regulation providing that “in 
the case of the direct or indirect delivery of advertising 
on behalf of a customer to the customer’s intended 
audience by electronic means, the service is delivered 
in Massachusetts to the extent that the audience for 
such advertising is in Massachusetts.”29 Accordingly, 
the regulation adopts a “look through rule,” presumably 
in an attempt to capture the location of the viewers. The 
regulation further provides that “[i]f the taxpayer cannot 
determine the state or states where the services are 
actually delivered to the end users . . . but has sufficient 
information regarding the place of delivery from which it 
can reasonably approximate the state or states where the 
services are delivered, it shall reasonably approximate 
such state or states.”30
Conceptually, this regulation is defective because it 
conflates the advertiser’s market with that of the content 
providers. The audience factor attempts to calculate the 
percentage of viewers by state, but these viewers are not 
the customers of the content providers. Moreover, this 
look through rule is exactly opposite the rule for sales of 
tangible personal property made to distributors. In that 
case, the sale would be assigned to the place of delivery 
to the distributor and not where the distributor resells 
the property as is true under a look through rule like an 
audience factor.
The audience factor is defective for administrative reasons 
as well. A content provider licensing its intellectual 
property to Hulu, Vudu, RIM, Amazon, Google, Yahoo, 
Apple, Netflix, DirecTV, or Dish TV, for example, will have 
no idea about either the billing address of its licensees’ 
customers, or where such content might be viewed by these 
customers.31 Passengers on Southwest Airline flights 
view movies distributed by Dish TV. The content providers 
have no idea over which states the viewers are located 
when they watch a movie. Anyone on Amtrak between 
Boston and Washington can observe riders watching a 
movie over the Internet while they pass through six states, 
or watching one that they downloaded over the Internet 
before starting.32 Even the distributors themselves do not 
know where their viewers are located in these cases—and 
8if they did, the information would not have to be shared 
with the content providers and might well be viewed 
as proprietary.
Even if it could be administered--which it cannot--an 
audience factor is conceptually defective because it 
focuses not on the customers and market of the content 
providers, but rather on the customers of their customers. 
In other words, the viewers are not customers of the 
content providers—they are the customers of: the local 
broadcast affiliates; the local cable affiliates; the Internet 
distributors like Hulu, Vudu, RIM, Amazon, Google, Yahoo, 
Apple, or Netflix; or satellite distributors like Dish TV 
or DirecTV. An audience factor would also have to take 
into account the international customers of the satellite 
distributors and the Internet distributors, which constitute 
a growing market.33
For similar reasons, a population factor is also defective 
on both conceptual and pragmatic grounds. A population 
factor would assign receipts of a content provider using the 
relative population of a state. If a state has three percent 
of the country’s population, for example, three percent of 
the receipts of a content provider would be assigned to the 
numerator of that state’s sales factor.
Conceptually, this approach suffers from the same 
defect as the audience factor. Even if one assumes that 
the viewers of the movies and programs produced by the 
content providers are uniformly distributed by relative 
population, this approach focuses not on the customers 
of the content providers, but rather on the customers of 
their customers. The viewers are not the customers of the 
content providers. 
But the assumption that the viewers are distributed by 
relative population of the states is wrong in many situations. 
Movies and shows, with their related advertising, are 
directed at different racial or ethnic groups, gender 
groups, age groups, religious groups, political groups, 
geographical groups, sports fans, music fans and the like. 
These demographic targets do not necessarily mirror a 
state’s relative population.34
To complicate matters further, companies like Hulu, 
Amazon, Google, Yahoo, Apple, Netflix, DirecTV, or 
Dish TV have international customers, which are an 
expanding market.35 A state’s relative population of the 
United States would ignore the non-U.S. viewers, thus 
overstating a particular state’s share of viewers. Taken 
together, the conceptual and pragmatic defects are 
fatal to using relative U.S. population for purposes of 
attributing the receipts of the content providers and raise 
constitutional questions.
The goal of the sales factor should be to assign the 
receipts of a content provider based on the location of 
its customers, which represents its market. The sales 
factor should rely on information that is directly knowable 
by the content provider and that can be verified by a 
tax administrator. Receipts should be attributed to a 
state without undue difficulty and should not be easily 
manipulated by taxpayers.
A more reasonable and compelling approach that 
satisfies these criteria is to use the state of the customer’s 
commercial domicile, the principal place from which the 
trade or business of the customer is directed or managed.36 
Consequently, it is the place where the customer exercises 
control over the programs and movies provided by the 
content provider and where decisions about advertising 
would typically be made.
The commercial domicile is the counterpart of the 
destination rule used for tangible personal property. Just 
the way control and possession over tangible personal 
property take place in the destination state, control and 
possession over the programs or movies provided by the 
content providers are likely to occur at their customers’ 
commercial domiciles, as will decisions about advertising.
The state of the customer’s commercial domicile also 
satisfies other criteria for an acceptable sales factor. 
It would be only by chance if the customer’s state of 
commercial domicile overlapped in any significant degree 
with the state of the content provider’s payroll or property, 
thereby avoiding a perceived defect with the costs of 
performance rule. 
The commercial domicile of any publicly traded 
corporation can be easily determined through annual 
reports or schedules filed with the Securities and 
Exchange Commission. Indeed, even without resort 
to these documents, the commercial domiciles of 
major advertisers or distributors are generally known in 
state tax circles. 
The commercial domicile is a brick and mortar location, 
often involving hundreds of thousands of square feet 
and thousands of employees. Changing a commercial 
domicile is a very serious and costly matter. No customer 
of a content provider will purposely change its commercial 
domicile at the request of a content provider. Consequently, 
the commercial domicile of a customer cannot be easily 
manipulated by a content provider.37
Assigning receipts based on the state of the commercial 
domicile of a content provider’s customer provides stability, 
predictability, and certainty. Commercial domiciles rarely 
change. The brick and mortar location of a commercial 
domicile is independent of technological developments, 
changes in the business model of content providers, or 
innovations in the Internet. It is free of all of the defects 
that infect the current approaches.
9Depending on the state, the commercial domicile rule 
could be implemented through legislation or under existing 
law by regulation or through equitable apportionment 
provisions.
Unlike UDITPA’s costs of performance rule, which is 
likely to assign all of the receipts to a particular state, a 
commercial domicile rule will assign the receipts from 
each of the content provider’s customers to different 
states. For example, some of the Fortune 500 and their 
states of commercial domicile include Office Depot 
(Florida), Eli Lilly (Indiana), McDonalds (Illinois), Principal 
Financial Group (Iowa), Staples (Massachusetts) and 
Lowes (North Carolina). Assigning receipts based on the 
customer’s state of commercial domicile will apportion 
the business income of a content provider to more states 
than will UDITPA’s costs of performance rule. 
IV. CONCLUSION
Assigning the sales and receipts of a content provider based 
on the state of the commercial domicile of its customer 
would modernize the apportionment formula, consistent 
with the principles of corporate income taxation. 
The use of a commercial domicile rule would bring 
stability, predictability, and certainty into the income 
taxation of content providers, enhancing a state’s business 
climate and providing a reliable source of revenue. 
The rule would be easily implemented by taxpayers, 
cannot be easily manipulated, and is easily verifiable by 
tax administrators. It would capture the actual location of 
the customers, which constitute the market of the content 
providers. 
The rule is free from the conceptual and administrative 
defects that plague other approaches, such as an audience 
factor or a population factor. Assigning sales based 
on the customer’s commercial domicile would greatly 
reduce litigation and would free a policy maker from the 
need for constant tinkering with the tax law every time 
a technological innovation leads to a new way of doing 
business for a content provider. This approach has already 
been adopted by some states.
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FOOTNOTES
1. The four national broadcast networks (NBC, ABC, Fox, and CBS) own some 
local TV stations, but most local stations are not owned by these four. The 
local TV stations are sometimes referred to in the industry as “affiliates” 
and the agreements between them and the national broadcast networks are 
referred to as “affiliation agreements.” The term “affiliate,” however, is not 
intended to denote common ownership or control between the networks and 
the local TV stations.
2. National cable operators typically have numerous local cable systems, 
operating as affiliates under franchises granted by the localities in which 
they do business. National cable operators receive content with embedded 
advertising from the content providers, and provide that as part of a bundled 
package to their local cable systems which, in turn, sell packages directly 
to subscribers throughout the country. These subscribers are the actual 
viewers of the content and advertising wholesaled to the national cable 
operators by the content providers.
3.  Satellite television operators sell packages to subscribers throughout the 
world.
4. The Internet distributors allow viewers to purchase content, rent it, or 
stream it live. Many of the viewers of the Internet distributors are also cable 
customers (notwithstanding that some cable customers can also watch 
programs remotely).
5. In 2007, the Uniform Law Commission (ULC), the successor to the group 
that adopted UDITPA, started a project to revise it. Two reporters to the 
project were appointed, one of whom is the author of this Paper. In 2009, 
after considerable public controversy, the ULC abandoned its efforts. In the 
same year, the Multistate Tax Commission (MTC) stepped into the breach 
and started a project to suggest revisions to five areas of UDITPA. The author 
of this Paper served as the Hearing Officer to the MTC. See Report of the 
Hearing Officer, Multistate Tax Compact Article IV, Proposed Amendments, 
published by Tax Analysts. On July 30, 2014, the Executive Committee of the 
MTC approved a number of changes to the language of UDITPA. Suggested 
revisions by the MTC have no legal status; they must be adopted by a 
legislature to become that state’s law.
6. For a fuller discussion, see Richard D. Pomp, State and Local Taxation, 7th 
ed., 2011, Ch. 10.
7. Sections 9-17, UDITPA. For a fuller discussion, see Pomp, supra note 6.
8. Income taxable by a state is the amount of the corporation’s total business 
income that is apportioned to the taxing state.
9. The sales factor is the ratio between a corporation’s sales in the taxing state 
divided by its sales everywhere.
10. The payroll factor is the ratio between a corporation’s payroll in the taxing 
state divided by its payroll everywhere.
11. The property factor is the ratio between a corporation’s property in the taxing 
state divided by its property everywhere.
12. UDITPA has special rules for nonbusiness income, which are not relevant to 
this Paper. For a discussion of those rules, see Pomp, supra note 6.
13. Compared with an evenly-weighted three-factor formula, a double-weighted 
sales factor results in increased tax on some corporations and decreased tax 
on others and has no effect on corporations that conduct all of their activities 
in the state. The tax effect depends on the mathematical relationship between 
the sales factor and the property and payroll factors. More specifically, 
corporations whose sales factors are less than the average of their 
property and payroll factors benefit from a double-weighted sales factor; 
other interstate corporations are disadvantaged. The former describes, for 
example, corporations with the bulk of their property and payroll in a state 
that sell outside that state.
14. Compared with a double-weighted sales factor, a single sales factor provides 
even greater tax benefit to corporations that are primarily producing inside 
the taxing state and selling outside that state.
15. Section 16, UDITPA.
16. In idiosyncratic situations involving the peculiar structure of a particular 
industry, the “distributor” may be an agent of the manufacturer, in which 
case a sale by the manufacturer might be assigned to the ultimate customer. 
This situation has nothing to do with content providers.
17. The Executive Committee of the MTC is suggesting a “look through” rule in 
the case of marketing intangibles. See Report of the Hearing Officer, supra 
note 5, at 51-54.
18. Section 17, UDITPA.
19. Criticism of the “all or nothing” approach has led some states to attribute 
receipts to a state in proportion to the costs of performance incurred in 
that state. To illustrate, consider the situation in the text where a multistate 
service provider has 4% of its costs of performance in State A and 3% of its 
costs of performance in each of 32 other states. Under a proportionate costs 
of performance rule, the taxpayer would assign 4% of its gross receipts to 
State A and 3% to each of the 32 other states. For other suggestions about 
changing UDITPA’s  costs of performance rule, see Report of the Hearing 
Officer, supra note 5, at 66-69.
20. For a rarefied discussion of the differences among the use of a license, the 
licensing of an intangible, and the sale of intellectual property, see TGS-
NOPEC Geophysical Co. v. Combs, 340 S.W.3d 432 (Tex.2011).
21. See Report of the Hearing Officer, supra note 5, at 46-54.
22. For a fuller discussion, see Report of the Hearing Officer, supra note 5, at 
14-28.
23. William Vickrey, The Corporate Income Tax in the U.S. Tax System, 73 Tax 
Notes 597, 602 (1996). 
24. The national broadcast and cable networks like Fox, CBS, CNN, MSNBC and 
ESPN deal with national advertisers; local businesses that wish to advertise 
deal with the local broadcast affiliates and not the content providers. 
Similarly, local businesses deal with the local affiliates of the national cable 
operators and not with the content providers.
25. See supra note 2.
26. California and New York, the first states to adopt an audience method, 
continue to be the headquarters of all of the major content providers. 
Because the principal business operations of the providers were in California 
and New York, those two states adopted the audience method as an economic 
incentive to encourage the industry to maintain and grow their businesses 
there. This method mitigated the harsh effects of California’s all or nothing 
costs of performance rule or of New York’s proportional costs of performance 
rule.
27. Chapter 63, Section 38(f), as amended by St. 2013, c. 46, s. 37 (effective 2014).
28. Id. 
29.  830 CMR 63.38.1(9)(d)4.c.ii(C).
30. Id. 
31. The well-known Nielsen ratings do not cover Internet distribution or satellite 
distribution but only cable operators and local television stations. Even in that 
case, the ratings are not refined enough for easy use as an audience factor. 
Nielsen ratings are based on geographic areas that are not coterminous with 
the boundaries of states (or of the District of Columbia). For example, the 
ratings for the Boston area include parts of New Hampshire and Vermont. 
The ratings for the District of Columbia area cover five states and the 
Philadelphia area covers three states.
32. It is estimated that nearly a majority of the U.S. population will watch full 
episodes of television programs digitally every month in 2014. U.S. Digital 
Viewers, eMarketer, April 16, 2014. U.S. advertising revenues from television 
content grows larger every year because of content viewed on the Internet. 
U.S. Internet Ad Revenue Surpasses Broadcast, Associated Press, April 10, 
2014.
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33. See infra note 35.
34. See Report of the Hearing Officer, supra note 5, at 53.
35. According to Netflix’s 2013 Form 10-K, it has more than 44 million streaming 
members in over 40 countries enjoying more than one billion hours of TV 
shows and movies per month. While some of this is content Netflix created 
itself, most is acquired from content providers. Id. at 1, 18, 48. DirecTV has 
17.6 million subscribers in Latin America. DirecTV 2013 Form 10-K, p. 13.
36. UDITPA defines “commercial domicile” to mean the principal place from 
which the trade or business of the taxpayer is directed or managed. Section 
1(b), UDITPA.
37. The concept of a commercial domicile is a long-standing feature of both 
corporate and tax law, which has not been abused. The states should be able 
to deal with any possible manipulation of the concept.
